



Do immigrant-origin candidates attract immigrant-origin voters in party-centred electoral 





A burgeoning literature on minority representation asks whether immigrant-origin voters are more 
likely to vote for candidates of immigrant-origin (CIOs) than for native candidates, thus giving parties 
incentives to nominate CIOs. At present, however, evidence of such a link comes exclusively from 
candidate-centred electoral systems. The present study intends to narrow this gap by examining the 
influence of CIOs on the voting behaviour of immigrant-origin citizens in Germany, a more party- 
centred electoral environment. An empirical analysis of opinion survey and candidate data from the 
2013 Bundestag election suggests that the electoral link between voters and candidates of immigrant- 
origin is considerable. This paper is thus the first one to show that CIOs are a significant factor for the 
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In the past few decades, large-scale immigration has diversified the voter market for political 
 
parties in Western democracies. In response to this development, a burgeoning body of 
literature shows that Western parties have increased their attention towards growing 
immigrant-origin electorates, not just through programmatic offers and ethnically targeted 
campaigning, but also by promoting candidates of immigrant-origin (CIOs) for elected office 
(Alba and Foner, 2015; Bird et al, 2011; Bloemraad and Schönwälder, 2013; Fonseca, 2011; 
Kittilson and Tate, 2005; Laurence and Maxwell, 2012; Wüst, 2016). An important 
assumption underlying this literature is that citizens of immigrant-origin are more likely to 
vote for CIOs than for native candidates, such that parties have incentives to nominate CIOs 
as a tool to attract the immigrant vote. 
At present, however, evidence of a link between immigrant-origin voters and candidates 
seems to be exclusively provided by studies conducted in electoral systems operating either in 
single-member districts, such as the UK or Canada (SMD) (Barreto, 2007; Fisher et al, 2015; 
Landa et al, 1995; Zingher and Farrer, 2016), or in systems using open-list proportional 
representation (PR), such as local elections in Belgium or Norway (Bergh and Bjorklund, 
2011; Teney et al, 2010). By contrast, less is known about this link in more party-centred 
electoral systems, for instance in the Dutch or Israeli closed-list PR or the German mixed- 
member proportional (MMP) systems. That may be, because incentives for candidate-based 
voting are strong in the former but weak in the latter type of electoral systems as the personal 
voting literature famously posits (e.g. Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart et al, 2005). 
Therefore, CIOs may be less likely to mobilise immigrant-origin voters in party-centred 
systems. 
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This paper argues that an electoral link between CIOs and immigrant voters exists in party- 
centred electoral contexts nonetheless. The argumentation highlights candidates’ involvement 
in local politics as a mechanism that raises immigrant-origin voters’ awareness of CIOs’ 
presence and thereby increases the appeal of CIOs’ parties in party-centred electoral systems. 
Empirically, the present study examines how the party vote choices of immigrant-origin 
voters vary with the local presence of CIOs in a “heavily party-oriented system” (Moser and 
Scheiner, 2005): Germany’s MMP system. A series of alternative-specific conditional logit 
models are applied utilising a combined dataset of self-collected candidate data and survey 
data from the 2013 German Longitudinal Election Studies (GLES) (Rattinger et al, 2014). 
The main finding from this analysis suggests that the local presence of CIOs influences the 
PR votes of immigrant-origin citizens considerably. Therefore, this paper contributes to the 
literature by showing that the electoral mobilisation of immigrant voters through means of 
nominating CIOs is not contradictory to party-centred electoral environments. The common 
assumption that CIOs can help parties to increase their vote returns from the immigrant-origin 





The electoral link between candidates and voters of immigrant-origin in party- 




According to social identity theory, behavioural homogeneity within social groups is shaped 
by the degree of societies’ stratification: the more the social mobility of individual group 
members depends on that of their group, the more homogenously group members will behave 
socially and politically (Tajfel and Turner, 1986, p. 10). Given that Western countries of 
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immigration are characterised by strong social and economic inequalities separating most 
immigrants and their descendants from the native majority population (Alba and Foner, 2015; 
Bird et al, 2011; Bloemraad and Schönwälder, 2013; Strijbis, 2014; Zingher and Farrer, 
2016), it is plausible to assume that immigrant-origin residents constitute a meaningful 
reference group for homogeneous group behaviour in light of social identity theory. 
This view is also supported by previous research on immigrants’ electoral behaviour. Social 
identity concepts have greatly helped solve the puzzle of immigrant-origin voters’ strong and 
consistent support for parties of the political left (Bergh and Bjorklund, 2011; Dancygier and 
Saunders, 2006; Messina, 2007; Sanders et al, 2014; Strijbis, 2014; Teney et al, 2010; Wüst, 
2004)1. This line of research suggests that neither immigrant-origin voters’ location in 
ideological space nor their class belonging can fully account for the left party bias. Rather, 
immigrants’ identification with group interests and their perception of a “linked fate” 
(Dawson, 1994) with other group members seems to be complementary with the perceived 
credibility of left-wing parties on improving the living conditions of immigrants and fighting 
discrimination in general, thus leading to an overwhelming support for these parties among 
disadvantaged immigrant groups (Dancygier and Saunders, 2006; Messina, 2007; Sanders et 
al, 2014; Strijbis, 2014). 
Such group-based considerations may also be the driving force behind an electoral link 
between voters and candidates of immigrant-origin. Minority candidates provide readily 
available voting cues to voters, that is, they are generally perceived to be more compassionate 
and trustworthy than other candidates in representing the political interests of disadvantaged 
groups (e.g. Banducci et al, 2004; Landa et al, 1995; McDermott, 1998). According to 
McConnoughy and co-authors, such candidate cues interact heavily with “linked fate” 
perceptions (McConnaughy et al, 2010). Similar to the impact of “linked fate” perceptions on 
immigrants’ left party support, immigrant-origin voters may also be more likely to support a 
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CIO than a native candidate in order to improve the political representation of the interests of 
disadvantaged groups more generally. In line with this, existing research on immigrants’ 
group voting behaviour in Western democracies confirms by and large that immigrant voters 
prefer CIOs over native candidates even if the CIO has a different immigrant background to 
the voter (Bergh and Bjorklund, 2011; McConnaughy et al, 2010; Teney et al, 2010; Zingher 
and Farrer, 2016). 
If group-based considerations underlie immigrants’ electoral support for left-wing parties and 
CIOs alike, the question arises of what happens if the voting cues encoded in the profiles of 
parties and candidates conflict. Do immigrant voters support right-wing parties if these 
nominate CIOs? Does it make a difference if left-wing parties nominate CIOs rather than 
native candidates? With reference to the classical literature on voting behaviour (Campbell et 
al, 1954; Lazarsfeld et al, 1944) we may think of the former scenario as a cross-pressure 
between the voting cues encoded in right-wing party ideology and CIOs. Attitudinal cross- 
pressures are well-known to make voters ambivalent regarding the evaluation of their voting 
alternatives, such that the influences of opposing voting cues are likely to cancel each other 
out (Lavine, 2001; Mutz, 2002). CIOs running for right-wing parties may thus attract fewer 
votes from the immigrant-origin electorate than CIOs running for left-wing parties. However, 
in settings of multiparty competition between several parties on the political left, the presence 
of a CIO on the left might re-enforce the voting cue of left-wing party ideology. Thus, CIO 
effects should mainly work on the political left, influencing which one of several left-wing 
parties is supported. This line of argumentation is also in line with previous scholarship, 
suggesting a left-wing bias of CIO effects on immigrants’ vote choices (Bergh and Bjorklund, 
2011; Teney et al, 2010; Zingher and Farrer, 2016). 
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However, evidence of CIO effects on immigrant-origin citizens’ voting behaviour is entirely 
based on research conducted in candidate-centred electoral systems; therefore it is based on 
evidence in most-likely electoral system contexts. In candidate-centred systems, like SMD or 
open-list PR, voters are said to have strong incentives to make candidate-based voting 
decisions, while this incentive should be widely missing in party-centred systems, like closed- 
list PR or MMP (Carey and Shugart, 1995). Here, by contrast, voters have strong incentives to 
make party-based rather than candidate-based voting decisions, because they can only support 
or defect a list of candidates as a whole, which provides little leeway to influence the electoral 
fate of individual candidates (Shugart et al, 2005). Since the notion of an electoral link 
between immigrant voters and CIO is candidate-based by definition, party-centred electoral 
systems provide for a least-likely electoral context to find support for this hypothesis (see 
Gerring and Seawright, 2007). 
This paper argues, by contrast, that other mechanisms than electoral systems’ incentives for 
personal voting can provide a link between immigrants’ voting behaviour and CIOs. The 
proposed argument relies on the notion that voters’ awareness of individual candidates is an 
important driver of candidate-based voting behaviour (Gschwend and Zittel, 2015, p. 341). 
On one hand, this kind of candidate awareness may be heightened if ballots provide voters 
with a choice between candidates rather than between parties (Shugart et al, 2005). However, 
on the other hand, voters’ awareness of individual candidates may also follow from 
candidates’ involvement in local politics. Candidates’ involvement in local politics is common 
in party-centred electoral systems, as informal rules of legislative recruitment typically 
require that political aspirants gather political experience in local government and/or party 
offices before they can become parliamentary candidates. Even as elected parliamentarians, 
they often hold local mandates simultaneously, thus ensuring their rootedness and visibility in 
the local community. Real world examples of these empirical patterns in party-centred 
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electoral environments extend to, for example, Germany (Wessels, 1997), Israel (Hazan, 
1999), Italy (Russo, 2011), the Netherlands (Leijenaar and Niemöller, 1997) and Portugal 
(Fernandes et al, 2017). 
As locally connected politicians, CIOs provide their parties with a means to conduct localised 
modes of campaigning, for example for the purpose of advertising the party label to certain 
immigrant voter groups. Indeed, scholarship shows that campaigning strategies in party- 
centred electoral systems have become more professional and sophisticated in targeting 
specific “focus groups” over the past few decades (Strömbäck, 2009). Given that immigrant- 
origin residents tend to be geographically concentrated, it makes sense for parties seeking the 
immigrant vote to direct their campaign resources to areas of high ethnic density (Sobolewska 
et al, 2013). According to Latner and McGann, list candidates can be viewed as 
geographically distributable campaigning resources (Latner and McGann, 2005, p. 713). 
Given CIOs’ local political involvement and parties’ incentives to utilise this, it is plausible to 
assume that many immigrant voters become aware of individual CIOs due to CIOs’ local 
political presence and activities. These may include candidates’ visibility as holders of local 
government and party office (Tavits, 2010), their status as locally known incumbent 
parliamentarians (Hainmueller and Kern, 2008; Manow, 2015, Chapter 4), and/or their local 
campaigning activities before an election (Gschwend and Zittel, 2015) such as canvassing 
ethnic community groups, knocking on doors of immigrant-origin voters, meeting them face- 
to-face in the pedestrian area or by giving interviews to local media. As a consequence of 
immigrant voters’ awareness of CIOs, “linked fate” perceptions of improved group 
representation may be enabled, ultimately increasing the likelihood of supporting the (left- 
wing) party that nominated the local CIO. In this chain of causation, candidate awareness 
plays thus the role of a mediator between CIOs’ local political involvement and immigrant 
voters’ party vote choices. In sum, as candidates are often locally known figures even in 
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party-centred electoral systems, the electoral link between immigrant voters and CIOs 
 
nominated by left-wing parties should work in party-centred electoral systems, as well. 
Based on these considerations, this paper’s hypotheses read: 
H1: Immigrant-origin voters, who are aware of a local CIO, are more likely to vote for the 
party of the CIO than for other parties. 
H2: The link between local CIOs and immigrant voters’ party vote choices, as stated in H1, is 









For the purpose of testing these hypotheses, the present paper provides a case study of 
immigrant voters’ party vote choices in the 2013 German Bundestag election. Over the past 
two decades, immigrant politics in Germany has been on the rise (e.g Schönwälder, 2012; 
Wüst, 2016). In 2013, approximately 20% of the residents and 9% of all eligible voters in 
Germany were of immigrant-origin, that is, born with foreign nationality or born to at least 
one parent with foreign nationality at birth (Bundeswahlleiter, 2013a). Consisting mainly of 
former “guest workers” and their descendants from south-eastern European countries or 
Turkey and of “ethnic Germans” mainly from Central Eastern European and/or countries of 
the former Soviet Union, nowadays Germany accounts for 20% of the entire EU’s immigrant 
 
population (OECD and EU, 2015). Given higher fertility rates (Schönwälder, 2012) and more 
recent large-scale influxes of refugees (commonly touted the “refugee crisis”) these numbers 
can be expected to grow even further in the future. Previous research in Germany shows that 
parties have responded to these developments by increasing their efforts to appeal to this new 
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and growing segment of the electorate, indicated by an increasing salience of immigrant- 
related content in party manifestos and by increasing numbers of CIOs at all political levels 
(Fonseca, 2011; Schönwälder, 2012; Wüst, 2016). 
However, an as of yet under-researched topic in German-specific research is whether 
immigrant-origin voters reward parties for their candidate offers. In Germany’s mixed- 
member proportional (MMP) system used for the federal parliament (the Bundestag), voters 
elect local representatives in 299 SMDs and simultaneously cast a vote for a closed party list 
in 16 multi-member districts which coincide geographically with the 16 federal states (PR 
tier). Given that PR votes determine parties’ seat shares in parliament due to a compensatory 
link between the two electoral tiers producing highly proportional election outcomes 
(Saalfeld, 2005), parties should mainly be interested in garnering PR votes from the 
immigrant electorate. Consequently, the system is often considered as belonging to the family 
of PR systems (e.g. Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Ruedin, 2013). Moser and Scheiner, for 
example, have described the German electoral system as “heavily party-oriented” with regard 
to citizens’ voting behaviour due the strong linkage between its tiers and a long-consolidated 
party system (Moser and Scheiner, 2005). 
For these reasons, the present paper considers Germany’s PR tier as a party-centred electoral 
context, and thus, from the perspective of the personal voting literature, as a least-likely case 
to find an electoral link between immigrant voters and CIOs. As CIOs’ local presence is 
expected to influence the party choices of voters of immigrant-origin, the analytical focus is 
on the effect of individual CIOs rather than on the CIO composition of party lists. In this 
respect, this paper’s focus on the PR tier of Germany’s MMP system has also a practical 
advantage: Germany facilitates the task of linking voters and CIOs in party lists 
unambiguously to the same geographical area, because most candidates run as dual 
candidates, that is, in a party list and in a local 
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constituency simultaneously (Manow, 2015). Simply put, the common practice of dual 
 
candidacy facilitates the study of whether immigrant-origin voters’ electoral behaviour in the 
PR tier vary systematically with the local presence of CIOs, thus resembling previous 








Given that this paper is interested in the interaction between candidates’ immigrant 
backgrounds and immigrant voters’ PR votes, the empirical analysis relies 
on voter-level and candidate-level data. Voter-level data is taken from the 2013 German 
 
Longitudinal Election Studies (GLES), which provides standard pre- and post-election survey 
data (Rattinger et al, 2014). Candidate- level data was assembled with the help of 
Parlamentwatch e.V., a registered German charity which presents on its website 
(www.abgeordnetenwatch.de) detailed background information on all 1493 constituency 
candidates, who ran for one of the main five party competitors (CDU/CSU, SPD, The Left, 
Greens, FDP) in the 2013 election. Available information includes candidates’ names, party 
affiliations and constituencies. 
A number of data preparation steps are conducted in order to combine the two data sources 
into one dataset for the empirical analysis. First, voters of immigrant-origin are identified in 
the GLES dataset2 by utilising survey questions relating to respondents’ citizenship at birth 
and their parents’ place of birth. In order to avoid being left with very few cases of immigrant 
voters, the merged file of the GLES pre- and post-election study is used. Since voters’ PR 
votes is the dependent variable of interest, the GLES dataset is reduced to all 
respondents who indicated either intention (pre-election study) or recollection (post-election 
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study) of casting a PR vote for one of the main five party competitors (CDU/CSU, SPD, The 
Left, Greens, FDP). Non-voters are excluded, while native respondents are kept in the dataset 
as a control group to which the voting behaviour of immigrant voters is compared to. The 
final voter level dataset contains 279 observations of voters of immigrant-origin and 2403 
observations of native voters, overall 2682 observations. 
 
The candidate dataset provides the independent variable of main interest, that is, whether or 
not a local candidate is of immigrant-origin (CIO). Candidates are coded as being of 
immigrant-origin if they were born either (a) abroad with foreign nationality at birth (first 
generation) or in Germany (b) with foreign nationality at birth or (c) with German nationality 
and at least one parent of foreign nationality at birth (second generation). Information on 
candidates’ migratory backgrounds is mainly taken from ‘Mediendienst Integration’ 
(Mediendienst Integration, 2013), a media service of the German academic ‘Rat für 
Migration’ (council on migration). ‘Mediendienst Integration’ conducted a survey with all 
press offices of the regional party associations before the 2013 election, asking for the names 
and origins of parties’ CIOs, which makes this data source “the best approximation on 
immigrant-origin candidates in the 2013 Bundestag election available” (Wüst, 2014, p. 2). 
With support of a student assistant, candidates’ immigrant backgrounds were again validated 
against publicly available sources, that is, mainly internet sources  (e.g. personal and 
party websites), and interviews in newspapers. In addition to that, we 
 
screened the official list of candidates of the Federal Electoral Commissioner 
(Bundeswahlleiter, 2013b) for potentially non-German names and birth places outside 
Germany and repeated the cross-validation for these cases. Overall, 96 out of 1493 
constituency candidates could be identified as being of immigrant-origin. Besides the variable 
CIO, we also coded, for the purpose of conducting robustness checks (see online 
supplementary material), the variable visible CIO to distinguish CIOs whose immigrant-origin 
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is easily rather than hard to recognise based on their first name and surname or physical 
appearance. Where the coding between the author and the student assistant differed, we 
discussed each case on an individual basis to reach a coding agreement. 
In order to merge the two datasets into one, the voter- level data is transformed into a long 
 
format, such that each voter appears in five rows for each of the five party vote choices in the 
dataset. This format allows the merging of the candidate-level data with voters’ party vote 
alternatives utilising identifier variables for the constituencies of voters and candidates.3 
Voters’ awareness of local candidates is the second independent variable of main interest. The 
measurement of this variable flows from a GLES survey item4 relating to respondents’ 
recollection of local candidates’ names and parties. Based on this information, candidate 
awareness takes a value of one for each party vote option in the merged dataset if a 
respondent was able to tell by recollection the name of a party’s local candidate and was also 
able to assign this candidate to the correct party, and zero otherwise (Gschwend and Zittel, 
2015, p. 342). 
A set of control variables is intended to control for alternative explanations of voting 
behaviour. Importantly, the analysis accounts for the socio-psychological, or “Michigan” 
model of voting (Campbell et al, 1954, 1960). This theoretical model envisions voting 
behaviour as affected by three attitudinal concepts. Voters’ party identification is 
conceptualised to be a long term psychological party membership developed over the course 
of an individual’s political life, while top candidate and issue orientations are conceptualised 
as short term adjustable influences (Campbell et al, 1954). As such, the three concepts are 
considered to influence voting behaviour as interplaying mediators of voters’ lifelong political 
socialisation at the end of a “funnel of causality” (Campbell et al, 1960, pp. 24–37). Party 
identification captures whether a voter identifies with a certain party as well as the strength of 
this identification. For each party vote option, values of 0 denote that a voter does not identify 
13  
with a certain party, and values between 1 and 5 indicate a weak to very strong identification 
with that party. Including this variable will also help to account for the possibility that 
immigrants’ support for a CIO may simply be an unobserved effect of immigrant voters’ 
support for left parties which are also more likely to nominate CIOs (Bergh and Bjorklund, 
2011). Rile self-placement provides summary measures of voters’ issue orientations as a self- 
placement on a scale from 1 (most left) to 11 (most right). To account for the influence of 
attitudes towards top candidates for chancellor, the variable chancellor preference captures 
whether a voter prefers the CDU/CSU (Angela Merkel) or SPD top candidate (Peer 
Steinbrück) or neither. 
A second set of control variables is immigrant-specific. First, the two largest immigrant groups in 
the dataset, that is voters descending from Poland or a country of the former USSR, with remaining 
immigrant respondents contained in a reference category, are controlled for. Including this variable 
is intended to account for a possible tendency of immigrants descending from post-Soviet countries 
of emigration to support the CDU/CSU (Wüst, 2004). Second, the inclusion of 
the variable first generation, capturing whether a voter has immigrated herself (=1) or whether 
s/he was born to at least one immigrant parent (=0), has the purpose of controlling for the 
possibility that second-generation immigrants may be better integrated into German society as 
compared to first-generation immigrants, wherefore immigrant group-based considerations 
may be less significant in the case of second- generation immigrants (e.g. 
Strijbis, 2014). 
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Moreover, two control variables are included to accommodate for the two-tier structure of the 
 
mixed-member system. First, respondents’ vote choice in the SMD tier (SMD vote) is 
included to account for the possibility that a voting decision in the PR tier is a spill- over 
effect of a nominal vote for a candidate in the SMD tier rather than a sincere vote for the party 
(Ferrara et al, 2005, Chapter 5; Hainmueller and Kern, 2008; Manow, 2015, Chapter 4). 
Second, system knowledge controls for whether or not respondents understand the 
consequences of the two vote choices, which might not always be the case in mixed-member 
systems where voting decisions may often be the result of a lack of system knowledge rather 
than a sincere vote (Jesse, 1988). The variable takes a value of one if the respondent can tell 
that the PRvote determines a party’s overall seat share, and zero otherwise. 
Moreover, as a last control variable, post-election survey accounts for whether a respondent 
was part of the GLES 2013 post-election study (=1), or of the pre-election study (=0) to 
account for the possibility that interview situations before and after elections may bias survey 
responses. 
 
(Table 1 here) 
 
 
In order to be transparent about a possible left-wing bias of immigrant voters’ PR votes, their 
 
party identification and CIOs, Table 1 presents how these party-related variables are 
 
distributed in the dataset. As can be seen in the first row, PR votes of immigrant respondents 
 
distribute rather evenly between right (CDU/CSU and FDP) and left-leaning parties (SPD, 
 
Greens, The Left), resembling similar patterns in the population of German-origin voters 
 
(second row). Neither the partisanship of immigrant respondents is biased towards left- 
 
leaning parties as shown in the third row, resembling again patterns in the population of 
 
German-origin voters, as shown in the fourth row. However, immigrant and native voters are 
 
both more likely to see CIOs of left-wing than of right-wing parties (fifth and sixth row). This 
 
picture coincides with the distribution of constituency CIOs across all parties in the candidate 
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dataset (seventh row). Therefore, it is rather a real world fact that most immigrant candidates 
 











The merged data file matches voters and candidates at the level of constituencies. Since this 
paper seeks to understand to what extent PR votes are “conditional on the 
characteristics of the choices”, here candidates’ immigrant backgrounds, the alternative- 
specific conditional logit model lends itself as a workhorse for the empirical analysis (Alvarez 
and Nagler, 1998, p. 56). Conditional logit is a mixture of two regression models designed to 
explain an unordered categorical dependent variable: a multinomial logit model explains the 
influence of factors varying at the level of choosers (case-specific) and a conditional choice 
logit model explains how factors varying at the level of choices (altenative-specific) influence 
the probability of choosing a particular outcome (Alvarez and Nagler, 1998; Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009, pp. 489–496; Long and Freese, 2014, pp. 460–61). A common running 
example is the analysis of people’s choice of travel options (e.g. bus, train or car), which is 
likely to depend not only on the affluence of the individual (case-specific), but also on the 
cost and duration of the travel options (alternative-specific) (e.g. Long and Freese, 2014, p. 
461). Similarly, conditional logit models are commonly used when party or candidate 
characteristics (alternative-specific) as well as voter characteristics (case-specific) are 
considered in the explanation of individual vote choices (e.g. Alvarez and Nagler, 1998; 
Ferrara et al, 2005, Chapter 5; Fisher et al, 2015; Gschwend and Zittel, 2015; Heath et al, 
2015). 
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In order to fit this statistical model, the data needs to be rearranged in a way that each 
respondent appears five times (in five rows) in the dataset, that is, one time for each party 
choice (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, pp. 489–490). Alternative-specific variables can vary 
across these five alternatives, while case-specific variables take values that are the same 
across the five alternatives (ibid., p. 490). Given this data structure, the multinomial logit 
component of the model explains the k possible alternatives through an estimation of k-1 
regression equations, each including the same number of case-specific covariates, thus 
producing for every covariate as many as k-1 coefficients overall (Alvarez and Nagler, 1998, 
p. 66). The conditional choice logit component, by contrast, estimates only one coefficient per 
alternative-specific covariate, indicating the impact of the covariate’s values across the 
alternatives on the probability that a given alternative is chosen (ibid., p. 66). 
Moreover, the alternative-specific coefficients allow the estimation of predicted probabilities and 
marginal effects to evaluate variation in the influence of these variables on the likelihood that a 
particular 
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alternative is chosen (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009, pp. 494–495; Long and Freese, 2014, pp. 
458–460). In order to minimise the number of estimated coefficients, independent 
variables that can be logically assigned to different party vote choices are considered 
alternative-specific even if these could be considered to be voter-specific (e.g. party 
identification) (for a similar approach see Gschwend and Zittel, 2015). To the contrary, only 
variables that cannot be logically assigned to the vote choices (e.g. Rile self-placement) are 







The empirical strategy is to fit conditional logit models separately for immigrant and native 
voters in order to examine whether associations found in the sample of immigrants are 
actually either immigrant-specific or resemble patterns in the population of native voters. 
Table 2 shows the estimated coefficients of four conditional logit models, with robust 
 
standard errors, clustered at the level of local constituencies, in parentheses. 
 
(Table 2 here) 
 
 
The local presence of CIOs, as models 1 and 2 demonstrate, affects the party vote choices of 
immigrant voters, but not those of voters without immigrant-origin. Even after controlling for 
alternative explanations of voting behaviour, immigrants’ likelihood of supporting a party is 
estimated to be positively and significantly affected by the presence of a local CIO from that 
party, while natives’ party support remains unaffected. Models 3 and 4 extend the estimation 
by the interaction of CIO and candidate awareness. As hypothesised in H1, the model 
estimations suggest that the impact of CIO on immigrant-origin voters’ support for a party is 
mediated by voters’ awareness of the candidates. When the interaction is added in the model 
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for immigrants (model 3), the coefficient of the CIO variable turns out to be statistically 
insignificant, while the interaction term turns out to be positive and highly significant. In the 
control group of natives, by comparison, neither CIO nor its interaction with candidate 
awareness shows significant effects. 
(Figure 1 here) 
 
Although inspecting alternative-specific regression coefficients indicates whether covariates 
of interest affect PR votes, they do not give an indication of how the effect 
may vary depending on CIOs’ party affiliation. Therefore, in order to assess how the effect 
varies by party affiliation, I estimate the marginal effects of voters’ awareness of local CIOs 
on their specific party support, based on models 3 and 4. Figure 1 visualises these estimations 
showing how the likelihood of supporting any of the five parties changes when voters are 
confronted with a local CIO from a specific party. Given that the relationship is contingent on 
their awareness of the CIO, the variable candidate awareness is held at one in the estimations. 
In line with H2, Figure 1 provides evidence in favour of the contention that immigrants’  
PR vote is only affected by their awareness of a local CIO, if the CIO is nominated 
 
by a left-wing party. The marginal effect plots on the left show that the effect of voters’ 
awareness of local CIOs varies strongly by party in the group of immigrant voters. The 
marginal effects for the two right-wing parties (FDP and CDU/CSU; shown in the top and 
bottom plots) suggest that the nomination of a CIO by one of these parties increases the 
likelihood of candidate-aware immigrant voters supporting the party by 0.09 and 0.11 
respectively. However, these effects are not estimated to be statistically significant. The 
picture changes strongly for the three parties on the left. If immigrant voters are aware of a 
local CIO from the Greens, the Left or the SPD, the likelihood of them supporting these 
parties increases by 0.63, 0.67 and 0.41 respectively. Moreover, the plots suggest a trade- 
off between the three left-wing parties, that is, immigrant-origin citizens’ voting decisions are 
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affected by the presence of a left-wing CIO in that the party of the CIO becomes more likely 
to be voted for to the extent that the other two left-wing parties become less likely to be voted 
for. This suggests that the local presence of CIOs mainly affects immigrant voters who tend to 
vote left of the centre, determining which particular left-wing party will be supported 
eventually. In the control group of native voters, by contrast, the picture could not be more 
different. Irrespective of party label, native voters’ PR votes are not found to be 
affected at all by the presence of a CIO when they are aware of the candidate. 
 
Results are robust to a variety of different model specifications, which can be inspected in the 









This paper engages with the research puzzle of the electoral link between voters and 
candidates of immigrant-origin under party-centred electoral rules. From the perspective of 
the personal voting literature (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart et al, 2005), it appears 
questionable whether parties can utilise CIOs to attract votes from the immigrant-origin 
electorate in such systems. Conversely, this paper argues that an electoral link exists between 
immigrant voters and CIO despite party-centred electoral rules. According to the proposed 
argument, parties have incentives to distribute list CIOs geographically as a campaigning 
resource in order to tap into immigrant-origin voter markets. Because CIOs are typically 
locally connected, for example as local councillors or party officials, they constitute a local 
voting cue to immigrant-origin voters. Provided that these candidates are perceived to better 
represent disadvantaged groups’ interests than native candidates, immigrant-origin voters 
should be more likely to support the parties of local CIOs than other parties. 
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In order to test this argument, this paper studies immigrant-origin citizens’ voting behaviour 
in the 2013 German Bundestag election based on a merged dataset of survey and candidate 
data. The main findings suggest that in Germany the electoral connection between voters and 
candidates of immigrant-origin is considerable: immigrant voters’ PR votes are strongly 
affected by the local presence of CIOs. The proposed mechanism underlying this link, that is, 
immigrant voters’ awareness of local CIOs affect their PR votes due to 
“linked fate” perceptions of improved group representation, is further corroborated by the 
statistical evidence. Finally, the analysis also suggests that this kind of party competition for 
immigrant-origin voters is mainly a game between parties of the left, in which the win of one 
left-wing party means the loss of another one. Crucially, all these relationships were found to 
be immigrant-specific, that is, the reported effects could not be replicated in the control group 
of native voters. 
It is important to note that the present study has limitations, though. One is that the analysis 
lacks the statistical power to isolate the relationship between voters and candidates of the 
same descent from that between voters and candidates belonging to different immigrant 
groups. However, in line with Zingher and Farrer it can be argued that this lack of precision 
should decrease the odds of verifying the electoral link between voters and candidates of 
immigrant-origin, thus rendering the analysis an even tougher test of the argument (Zingher 
and Farrer, 2016)5. The finding of a significant relationship therefore provides strong 
evidence in favour of the proposed argument and suggests that “linked fate” perceptions 
associated with the presence of a CIO may surpass ethnic and/or national boundaries with 
regard to voting behaviour. 
Doubts may also be expressed as to whether these results are driven by the case selection of 
Germany’s MMP system. Indeed, the simultaneous existence of an electoral tier operating in 
geographical constituencies and the common dual candidacy practice constitute a 
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unique feature of MMP as compared to “pure” closed-list PR systems. However, it is not too 
implausible that this paper’s finding generalises to the latter type of system as well, because 
the two systems show striking similarities with regard to key aspects of the proposed 
argument. First, both systems ensure a high level of proportional representation, due to which 
they provide similar vote-seeking incentives for parties as each additional vote has the 
potential to increase a party’s seat shares. Second, locally connected list candidates are not 
unique to Germany, given the common empirical patter of list candidates simultaneously 
holding local government or party offices in a number of closed-list PR systems. Since 
immigrant-origin citizens tend to cluster geographically, parties in both types of systems 
should have incentives to exploit their CIOs’ local attachments to create vote returns from the 
immigrant-origin electorate. Nevertheless, future research is needed to examine the 
generalisability of the electoral link in other party-centred electoral systems, for example in 
the Netherlands or Israel, where two of the most proportional closed-list systems are 
combined with the requirement for candidates to retain local attachments (Hazan, 1999; 
Leijenaar and Niemöller, 1997). 
Despite these limitations, this paper makes a major contribution to previous literature. It 
extends previous research (Barreto, 2007; Bergh and Bjorklund, 2011; Landa et al, 1995; 
McConnaughy et al, 2010; Teney et al, 2010; Zingher and Farrer, 2016), by presenting the 
first case study that supports the hypothesis of mobilisation effects as a consequence of CIOs’ 
presence in a least-likely party-centred electoral environment. Thereby, it contributes to this 
literature by raising doubts about the moderating influence of electoral systems. Least-likely 
case studies are essential for the accumulation of knowledge, because they make it harder to 
corroborate deductively derived hypotheses and help to rule out rival hypothesis, thus 
increasing our confidence in the validity of the hypotheses if supported (Gerring and 
Seawright, 2007). As such, this case study substantiates the frequently made assumption that 
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parties in party-centred systems of proportional representation have vote-seeking incentives to 
provide for more descriptive representation of immigrant-origin citizens in their party lists. 
Moreover, a secondary finding of the presented analysis may also point to a possible 
advantage of party-centred as compared to candidate-centred electoral systems. The non- 
finding of an effect of CIOs in the control group of native voters, a finding that reiterates 
previous research in Germany (Street, 2014), stands in contrast to the repeatedly found 
electoral penalty for ethnic minority candidates in the UK’s first-past-the-post system (e.g. 
Fisher et al, 2015). A possible explanation may be that CIOs face less discrimination in more 
party-centred electoral systems due to weak personal voting incentives, while at the same time 
ensuring that locally connected CIOs remain visible to immigrant-origin voters as a result of 
the proposed argument. At this point, however, this intuition is largely speculative but may be 




1 An exceptions to this pattern applies, however, to the 
 
immigrants group of so-called “ethnic Germans”, whose troubled history with 
 
communist parties has made them overwhelmingly supporters of the Christian Democrats 
(Wüst, 2004). 
2 Please see Appendix Table 1 in the supplementary material for a detailed overview and 
description of the GLES variables used in this article and how they were recoded. 
3 Please see Appendix Table 2 in the supplementary material for a detailed 
 
description of the specific immigrant backgrounds of voters and candidates, and of 
 




4 The translated question wording (own translation) of this item (v82a-e) is: “Do you know 
 
the name of one or several district candidates and can you maybe even tell me for which party 
 
these candidates are running in the Election on 22nd September 2013? Please tell me the 
 
name and party of the candidates.” 
. 
 
5 Assuming that the electoral link between immigrant-origin voters and candidates is stronger 
 
if they are of same rather than of different descent, it should be more difficult to establish the 
 
link statistically in the latter case. According to hypothesis-testing theory, such a situation 
 
would increases the probability of a type II error, that is, failing to reject the null-hypothesis 
 
(i.e. no relationship) even if the null-hypothesis is wrong (i.e. relationship exists) (Cameron 
 
and Trivedi, 2009, p.407; Zingher and Farrer, 2016, p. 695). As it should become more 
 
difficult to establish a relationship as a type II error becomes more likely, our confidence in 
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Table 1: Distribution of party-related variables in the used dataset 
 
CDU/CSU FDP SPD Green The Left no party 
 
Immigrants’ PR N 












Natives’ PR votes N 1,015 101 747 247 293 - 
for…a % 42.24 4.2 31.1 10.3 12.2  
Immigrants N 106 5 64 33 17 54 
identifying with…a % 38.0 1.8 22.9 11.8 6.1 19.4 
Natives identifying N 882 47 650 170 219 435 
with…a % 36.7 2.0 27.0 7.1 9.1 18.1 
 
Immigrants who see N 












Natives who see a N 66 39 162 187 212 - 
CIO from …ab % 2.7 1.6 6.7 7.8 8.8  
Total no. of CIO N 9 9 20 26 32 - 
running for…c % 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.7 2.1  
Note: based on the data described in the text; a based on the merged data file; b voters may see 
more than one candidate of immigrant-origin; c based on the candidate data file, percentages 
based on all candidate observation 
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Table 2: Determinants of immigrants’ and natives’ PR votes 
 












Alternative-specific determinants of party     
vote choice:     
CIO 1.58** -0.23 0.36 -0.42 
 (0.53) (0.32) (0.44) (0.39) 
Candidate awareness 1.72** 0.86*** 1.42* 0.84*** 
 (0.53) (0.15) (0.59) (0.14) 
CIO # awareness   2.92** 0.37 
   (0.91) (0.61) 
Party identification 0.75*** 0.64*** 0.77*** 0.64*** 
 (0.16) (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) 
SMD vote 0.63+ 1.39*** 0.62 1.39*** 
 (0.34) (0.12) (0.38) (0.12) 
Case-specific determinants of SPD vote     
relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey 0.18 0.10 0.16 0.10 
 (0.74) (0.25) (0.73) (0.25) 
System knowledge 0.39 -0.52* 0.43 -0.51* 
 (0.71) (0.26) (0.71) (0.26) 
Former USSR a -0.62 (dropped) -0.67 (dropped) 
 (0.92)  (0.88)  
Poland a 0.75 (dropped) 0.65 (dropped) 
 (0.85)  (0.87)  











 (0.85) (0.44) (0.79) (0.44) 
Neither Merkel nor 3.19*** 2.03*** 3.27*** 2.03*** 
Steinbrück b (0.87) (0.49) (0.88) (0.49) 
Rile self-placement -0.44* -0.23** -0.42* -0.23** 
 (0.21) (0.08) (0.20) (0.08) 
INTERCEPT 0.36 0.68 0.34 0.68 
 (1.45) (0.50) (1.54) (0.50) 
Case-specific determinants of The Left     
vote relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey 0.38 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.87) (0.27) (0.94) (0.27) 
System knowledge 1.07 -0.74** 1.17 -0.73** 
 (0.81) (0.27) (0.84) (0.27) 
Former USSR a -1.60+ (dropped) -1.52+ (dropped) 
 (0.94)  (0.91)  
Poland a 1.48+ (dropped) 1.31 (dropped) 
 (0.85)  (0.84)  











 (0.93) (0.48) (0.89) (0.48) 
Neither Merkel nor 4.61*** 2.68*** 4.76*** 2.69*** 
Steinbrück b (0.93) (0.44) (0.94) (0.44) 
Rile self-placement -0.85** -0.79*** -0.85* -0.79*** 
 (0.33) (0.09) (0.36) (0.09) 
INTERCEPT 1.52 3.25*** 1.85 3.25*** 
 (1.77) (0.54) (2.04) (0.54) 
Case-specific determinants of Green vote     
2  
relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey 0.15 0.06 0.04 0.06 
 (0.77) (0.31) (0.78) (0.31) 
System knowledge 1.29 -0.19 1.39+ -0.18 
 (0.80) (0.28) (0.84) (0.28) 
Former USSR a -1.42 (dropped) -1.47 (dropped) 
 (0.97)  (1.06)  
Poland a 0.54 (dropped) 0.75 (dropped) 
 (0.94)  (0.94)  











 (0.78) (0.42) (0.73) (0.42) 
Neither Merkel nor 2.91** 1.84*** 3.50*** 1.84*** 
Steinbrück b (0.96) (0.48) (0.94) (0.49) 
Rile self-placement -0.33+ -0.33*** -0.46* -0.33*** 
 (0.19) (0.09) (0.22) (0.09) 
INTERCEPT 0.41 1.49* 0.81 1.47* 
 (1.32) (0.59) (1.41) (0.60) 
Case-specific determinants of FDP vote     
relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey -0.34 -0.41 -0.41 -0.41 
 (1.35) (0.36) (1.29) (0.36) 
System knowledge -1.15 -0.93** -1.16 -0.93** 
 









 (0.69)  (0.66)  
Poland a 1.76 (dropped) 1.81+ (dropped) 
 (1.08)  (1.07)  











 (1.48) (0.64) (1.38) (0.64) 
Neither Merkel nor 2.58* -0.64 2.70* -0.63 
Steinbrück b (1.23) (0.92) (1.20) (0.92) 
Rile self-placement 0.35 0.08 0.37 0.08 
 (0.28) (0.10) (0.27) (0.10) 
INTERCEPT -2.79 -0.32 -2.82 -0.33 
 (2.05) (0.71) (2.05) (0.72) 
N (alternatives) 1235 10930 1235 10930 
N (cases) 247 2154 247 2154 
Bic 635.31 2501.82 626.06 2510.18 
Note: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; robust standard errors, clustered on constituencies, are 
shown in parentheses; models estimated on weighted data to compensate for an oversampling of East German 
regions and to make the data more representative of the socio-structural outlook of the German voting age 
population (weight variable in the GLES 2013 dataset: w_ipfges_2); a reference category is remaining immigrant 
groups; b reference group is Merkel 
 
Figure 1: Marginal effects of CIOs on the likelihood of supporting specific parties 
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Original variable name(s) in 
dataset 
Questionnaire wording (own 
translation) 
Recoding/ Usage 
v11ba (Party vote: pre-election 
survey) 
n11ba (Party vote: post-election 
survey) 
Example pre-election study: 
 
“In the Bundestag election you 
can cast two votes. The first 
vote for a candidate in your 
electoral district and a second 
vote for a party. Here is a ballot 
specimen similarly to the one 
you will be provided with for 
the election. How are you going 
to vote?” 
 
(21) CDU/CSU (Christlich 
Demokratische Union/Christich- 
Soziale Union) 
(22) SPD (Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands) 
(23) FDP (Freie Demokratische 
Partei) 
(24) DIE LINKE (DIE LINKE) 
(25) GRÜNE (BÜNDNIS 
90/DIE GRÜNEN) 





(28) AfD (Alternative für 
Deutschland) 
(29) other party 
(-83) invalid vote 
(-97) not applicable 
(-98) don’t know 
(-99) no answer 
PR vote (alternative-specific): 
 
(1) Intention/recollection of 
voting for… 
(0) No intention/recollection of 
voting for party… 
 
Per vote choice: 
(1) CDU/CSU 
(2) SPD 




remaining observations ignored 
vn195 (German citizenship 
since birth) 
„Do you have German 





(-98) don’t know 
(-99) no answer 
Used to split dataset into an 
immigrant voters and 
distinguish different immigrant 





vn198 (Country of birth other 
than Germany) 
“Please tell me where you were 
born.” 
 
(1) former German territory 
 
Variables used from the German Longitudinal Election Studies 2013 (Rattinger 
et al., 2014) 








(5) Former USSR 
(6) Greece 




(9) Slovakia, Czech Republic, 
Former Czechoslovakia 







(16) other country 
(-97) not applicable 
(-98) don’t know 
(-99) no answer 
 
vn203 (Father’s country of birth 
other than Germany) 
vn204 (Mother’s country of 
birth other than Germany) 
Example respondent’s mother: 
 
“Please tell me where your 
mother was born.” 
 
(1) former German territory 




(5) Former USSR 
(6) Greece 




(9) Slovakia, Czech Republic, 
Former Czechoslovakia 







(16) other country 
(-97) not applicable 
(-98) don’t know 
(-99) no answer 
v82a-e (Local candidate “Do you know the name of one Candidate awareness 
4 
 
knowledge: pre-election survey) 
n82a-e (Local candidate 
knowledge: post-election 
survey) 
or several district candidates 
and can you maybe even tell me 
for which party these candidates 
are running in the Election on 
September 22 2013? Please tell 




(1) Name and party correct 
(2) Name correct, party 
incorrect 
(3) Name correct, no party 
mentioned 
(4) Name incorrect, but party 
mentioned 
(5) Neiter name nor party 
(alternative-specific): 
 
(1) Name and party correct 
(0) otherwise 
 
Per vote choice: 
(1) CDU/CSU 
(2) SPD 
(3) The Left 
(4) Greens 
(5) FDP 
v11aa (Candidate vote: pre- 
election survey) 
n11aa (Candidate vote: post- 
election survey) 
Example pre-election study: 
 
“In the Bundestag election you 
can cast two votes. The first 
vote for a candidate in your 
electoral district and a second 
vote for a party. Here is a ballot 
specimen similarly to the one 
you will be provided with forthe 
election. How are you going to 
vote?” 
 
(21) CDU/CSU (Christlich 
Demokratische Union/Christich- 
Soziale Union) 
(22) SPD (Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands) 
(23) FDP (Freie Demokratische 
Partei) 
(24) DIE LINKE (DIE LINKE) 
(25) GRÜNE (BÜNDNIS 
90/DIE GRÜNEN) 





(28) AfD (Alternative für 
Deutschland) 
(29) other party 
(-83) invalid vote 
(-97) not applicable 
(-98) don’t know 
(-99) no answer 
SMD vote (alternative-specific): 
 
(1) Intention/recollection of 
voting for candidate from … 
(0) No intention/recollection of 
voting for candidate from… 
 
Per vote choice: 
(1) CDU/CSU 
(2) SPD 
(3) The Left 
(4) Greens 
(5) FDP 
vn119a (Party Identification) “In Germany many people have 
a long-term tendency to identify 
with a certain political party, 
even if they vote sometimes for 
Party identification (alternative- 
specific): 
 
(5) very strong identification 
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 a different party. What about 
you: Generally speaking, do you 
identify with a certain party? 







(7) DIE LINKE 
(6) GRÜNE 
(215) PIRATEN (Piratenpartei 
Deutschland) 
(206) NPD 
(322) AfD (Alternative für 
Deutschland) 
(801) other party 
(808) no party 
(-98) don’t knoe 
(-99) no answer 
with party 
(4) strong identification with 
party 
(3) moderate identification with 
party 
(2) weak identification with 
party 
(1) very weak identification 
with party 
(0) no identification with party 
 
Per vote choice: 
(1) CDU/CSU 
(2) SPD 
(3) The Left 
(4) Greens 
(5) FDP 
vn120 (Strength of Party 
Identification) 
“How strong or weak is your 
identification with this party?” 
 
(1) very strongly 
(2) rather strongly 
(3) moderately 
(4) rather weakly 
(5) very weakly 
(-97) not applicable 
(-98) don’t know 
(-99) no answer 
vn62 (left-right self-placement) “In politics people often talk 
about “left” and “right”. On a 
scale from 1 till 11, on which 1 
is “left” and 11 is “right”, where 
would you place yourself ?” 
 










(11) 11 right 
(-97) not applicable 
(-98) don’t know 
(-99) no answer 
Rile self-placement 
v41 (Chancellor preference: pre- 
election survey) 
n41 (Chancellor preference: 
Example pre-election study: 
 




post-election survey) chancellor after the Bundestag 
election: Angela Merkel or Peer 
Steinbrück?” 
 
(1) Angela Merkel 
(2) Peer Steinbrück 
(3) neither/nor 
(-97) not applicable 
(-98) don’t know 
(-99) no answer 
 
vn7 (Political knowledge: 
Candidate and party vote) 
In the Bundestag election you 
will have two votes, a first and a 
second vote. Which of these 
votes determined the seat 
distribution in the Bundestag?” 
System knowledge 
 
(1) correct answer (second vote) 
(0) incorrect answer 
 
(1) the first vote 
(2) the second vote 
(3) both votes are equally 
important 
(-98) don’t know 




Distribution of variables of main interestVoters and candidates of immigrant- 
origin in the datasets 
Appendix Table 2 provides an overview of how voters’ and candidates’ immigrant 
backgrounds distribute in the merged data file. Since the assignment of immigrant 
backgrounds to certain categories is predetermined in the GLES dataset, the candidate data 
was accommodated to match the GLES categorisation scheme shown in Appendix Table 2. 
The second column shows the distribution of immigrant voters’ origins in the dataset. Citizens 
of Polish-origin, closely followed by those descending from a country of the former Soviet 
Union, provide the largest groups (2.4%) in the sample, while Turkish-origin respondents are 
in the third place with 1.3%. These are also the three largest immigrant groups in the German 
population. The second column displays the distribution of candidates’ immigrant 
backgrounds seen by immigrant voters on the ballot. Overall, every third immigrant voter 
(34.1%) in the sample is confronted with a CIO. 
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Appendix Table 2: Voters’ and candidates’ immigrant backgrounds in the dataset 
 
 Voters of … origin 
(N / % of voters) 
Immigrant voters 
facing at least one 
candidate of … origin 
on the ballot (N / % of 
immigrant voters) 
Native voters facing at 
least one candidate of 
… origin on the ballot 
(N / % of native 
voters) 
German 2403 / 89.6% 279 / 100% 2403 / 100% 
Any immigrant 279 / 10.4% 95 / 34.1% 615 / 25.6% 
Turkish 36 / 1.3% 41 / 14.7% 259 / 10.8% 
Italian 10 / 0.4% 0 7 / 0.3% 
Polish 65 / 2.4% 0 12 / 0.5% 
Former USSR 64 / 2.4% 6 / 2.2% 43 / 1.8% 
Greek 4 / 0.1% 2 / 0.7% 21 / 0.9% 
Former 
Yugoslavia 
13 / 0.5% 3 / 1.1% 26 / 1.1% 
Austrian 4 / 0.1% 2 / 0.7% 29 / 1.2% 
Czech/ Slovak 31 / 1.2% 9 / 3.2% 21 / 0.9% 
Scandinavian 2 / >0.1% 0 0 
Belgian/ Dutch 3 / 0.1% 6 / 2.2% 55 / 2.3% 
French 2 / >0.1% 2 / 0.7% 10 / 0.4% 
US 1 / >0.1% 0 0 
Other 44 / 1.6% 33 / 11.8% 233 / 9.7% 
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In order to be transparent about a possible left-wing bias of immigrant voters’ PR vote 
 
choices, their party identification and CIOs, Appendix Table 3 presents how these party- 
 
related variables are distributed in the dataset. As can be seen in the first row, PR votes of 
 
immigrant respondents distribute rather evenly between right (CDU/CSU and FDP) and left- 
 
leaning parties (SPD, Greens, The Left), resembling similar patterns in the population of 
 
German-origin voters (second row). Neither the partisanship of immigrant respondents is 
 
biased towards left-leaning parties as shown in the third row, also resembling patterns in the 
 
population of German-origin voters shown in the fourth row. However, immigrant and native 
 
voters are both more likely to see CIOs of left-wing than of right-wing parties (fifth and sixth 
 
row). This picture coincides with the distribution of constituency CIOs across all parties in the 
 
candidate dataset (seventh row). Therefore, it is rather a real world fact that most immigrant 
 
candidates run for parties of the political left than a bias in the used data. 
10 
 
Appendix Table 3: Distribution of party-related variables in the used dataset 
 
CDU/CSU FDP SPD Green The Left no party 
Immigrants’ PR 
votes for…a 
























































Immigrants who see N 












Natives who see a N 66 39 162 187 212 - 




Note: based on the data described in the text; a based on the merged data file; b voters may see 
more than one candidate of immigrant-origin; c based on the candidate data file, percentages 
based on all candidate observation 
Total no. of CIO N 9 9 20 26 32 - 





Appendix Table 4 3 shows that the results of the main analysis can be replicated when the 
 
data is not weighted in the statistical estimation to compensate for an oversampling of East 
German regions and to make the data more representative of the socio-structural outlook of 
the German voting age population. Appendix Table 5 4 presents additional models with the 
variable CIO being exchanged for visible CIO. And finally, Appendix Table 6 5 shows the 
 
results of two alternative-specific mixed conditional logit models to check whether the CIO 
effect suffers from a potential violation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption (IIAA). The IIAA implies that the ratio of the probability of choosing one party to 
the probability of choosing a second party is unchanged for individual voters if a third viable 
party enters or drops out of the electoral race (Alvarez & Nagler, 1998, p. 57; Dow & 
Endersby, 2004, p. 111). Alternative-specific mixed conditional logit relaxes the IIAA and 
thus provides a robustness check for the standard conditional logit model (for more details see 
Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, pp. 513–16). A violation of the IIAA is likely in studies of voting 
behaviour because adding a party that is viable and ideological proximate to another party is 
likely to change the voting decisions of some respondents. However, such party entries or 
exits are rarely realistic scenarios according to Dow and Endersby. Following the 
argumentation of the authors, the importance of the IIAA should not be exaggerated in 
applied research settings because democratic elections tend to be contested by a fixed and 
stable pool of parties (Dow and Endersby, 2004, p. 112-113). In any case, the alternative- 
specific mixed conditional logit models replicate the finding of CIO effects on immigrant 
voters’ party choices. 
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Appendix Table 43: Robustness alternative-specific conditional logit models (unweighted data) 
 Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: 
 Immigrants’ Natives’ Immigrants’ Natives’ 
 PR votes PR votes PR votes PR votes 
Alternative-specific determinants of     
party vote choice:     
CIO 1.35* -0.07 0.20 -0.41 
 (0.54) (0.26) (0.43) (0.33) 
Candidate awareness 1.52** 0.91*** 1.22* 0.88*** 
 (0.49) (0.13) (0.52) (0.13) 
CIO # awareness   2.55* 0.65 
   (1.00) (0.51) 
Party identification 0.70*** 0.63*** 0.71*** 0.63*** 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.16) (0.05) 
SMD vote 0.95** 1.54*** 0.96** 1.54*** 
 (0.32) (0.11) (0.34) (0.11) 
Case-specific determinants of SPD     
vote relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey 0.39 0.19 0.39 0.18 
 (0.66) (0.24) (0.63) (0.24) 
System knowledge 0.50 -0.60** 0.50 -0.60** 
 (0.60) (0.22) (0.60) (0.22) 
Former USSR a -0.94 (dropped) -0.97 (dropped) 
 (0.85)  (0.81)  
Poland a 0.77 (dropped) 0.77 (dropped) 
 (0.75)  (0.77)  











 (0.61) (0.42) (0.63) (0.42) 
Neither Merkel nor 2.76** 1.84*** 2.80** 1.84*** 
Steinbrück b (0.85) (0.38) (0.88) (0.38) 
Rile self-placement -0.49** -0.19** -0.48* -0.19** 
 (0.19) (0.07) (0.19) (0.07) 
INTERCEPT 0.76 0.41 0.77 0.41 
 (1.23) (0.47) (1.32) (0.47) 
Case-specific determinants of The     
Left vote relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey 0.66 0.11 0.40 0.11 
 (0.73) (0.27) (0.78) (0.27) 
System knowledge 1.50* -1.09*** 1.66* -1.08*** 
 (0.73) (0.23) (0.79) (0.23) 
Former USSR a -1.22 (dropped) -1.19 (dropped) 
 (0.79)  (0.79)  
Poland a 0.81 (dropped) 0.74 (dropped) 
 (0.86)  (0.87)  











 (0.84) (0.46) (0.88) (0.46) 
Neither Merkel nor 3.85*** 2.56*** 4.13*** 2.57*** 
Steinbrück b (0.94) (0.40) (0.98) (0.40) 
Rile self-placement -0.78** -0.66*** -0.82** -0.66*** 
 (0.29) (0.09) (0.31) (0.09) 
INTERCEPT 2.09 2.71*** 2.38 2.71*** 
 (1.56) (0.57) (1.68) (0.57) 
Case-specific determinants of Green     
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vote relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey 0.22 0.05 0.17 0.04 
 (0.65) (0.28) (0.65) (0.28) 
System knowledge 1.10+ -0.33 1.21+ -0.32 
 (0.67) (0.25) (0.70) (0.25) 
Former USSR a -1.55+ (dropped) -1.63+ (dropped) 
 (0.86)  (0.94)  
Poland a 0.55 (dropped) 0.72 (dropped) 
 (0.82)  (0.83)  











 (0.55) (0.42) (0.55) (0.42) 
Neither Merkel nor 2.83** 1.62*** 3.29*** 1.61*** 
Steinbrück b (0.94) (0.40) (0.94) (0.40) 
Rile self-placement -0.31+ -0.24** -0.43* -0.23** 
 (0.16) (0.09) (0.18) (0.09) 
INTERCEPT 0.72 0.86 1.03 0.83 
 (1.12) (0.58) (1.18) (0.59) 
Case-specific determinants of FDP     
vote relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey -0.23 -0.49 -0.30 -0.49 
 (1.16) (0.31) (1.12) (0.31) 
System knowledge -1.07 -0.71* -1.06 -0.71* 
 









 (0.64)  (0.63)  
Poland a 1.79 (dropped) 1.84 (dropped) 
 (1.11)  (1.13)  











 (1.15) (0.61) (1.06) (0.61) 
Neither Merkel nor 2.41+ -1.09 2.53* -1.08 
Steinbrück b (1.26) (0.84) (1.25) (0.84) 
Rile self-placement 0.33 0.20* 0.32 0.20* 
 (0.22) (0.09) (0.23) (0.09) 
INTERCEPT -2.50 -1.19+ -2.47 -1.21+ 
 (1.67) (0.69) (1.73) (0.69) 
N (alternatives) 1235 10930 1235 10930 
N (cases) 247 2154 247 2154 
Bic 544.27 2464.92 563.39 2471.69 
Note: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; robust standard errors, clustered on constituencies, are 
shown in parentheses; models estimated on unweighted data; 
a 
reference category is remaining immigrant 
groups; 
b 
reference group is Merkel 
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Appendix Table 54: Robustness alternative-specific conditional logit models (visible CIO) 
 Model 1: Model 2: Model 3: Model 4: 
 Immigrants’ Natives’ Immigrants’ Natives’ 
 PR votes PR votes PR votes PR votes 
Alternative-specific determinants of     
party vote choice:     
Visible CIO 1.69** -0.16 0.36 -0.20 
 (0.59) (0.29) (0.54) (0.33) 
Candidate awareness 1.79*** 0.86*** 1.52** 0.86*** 
 (0.52) (0.15) (0.54) (0.14) 
Visible CIO # awareness   2.99** 0.09 
   (1.00) (0.63) 
Party identification 0.71*** 0.64*** 0.71*** 0.64*** 
 (0.16) (0.05) (0.17) (0.05) 
SMD vote 0.68* 1.39*** 0.72+ 1.39*** 
 (0.33) (0.12) (0.37) (0.12) 
Case-specific determinants of SPD     
vote relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.11 
 (0.69) (0.25) (0.68) (0.25) 
System knowledge 0.47 -0.52* 0.48 -0.52* 
 (0.71) (0.26) (0.71) (0.26) 
Former USSR a -0.62 (dropped) -0.68 (dropped) 
 (0.93)  (0.90)  
Poland a 0.88 (dropped) 0.70 (dropped) 
 (0.83)  (0.85)  











 (0.74) (0.44) (0.76) (0.44) 
Neither Merkel nor 3.15*** 2.03*** 3.26*** 2.02*** 
Steinbrück b (0.88) (0.49) (0.90) (0.49) 
Rile self-placement -0.46* -0.23** -0.44* -0.23** 
 (0.21) (0.08) (0.21) (0.08) 
INTERCEPT 0.39 0.67 0.40 0.67 
 (1.45) (0.50) (1.53) (0.50) 
Case-specific determinants of The     
Left vote relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey 0.32 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 
 (0.83) (0.27) (0.90) (0.27) 
System knowledge 1.18 -0.74** 1.23 -0.74** 
 (0.80) (0.27) (0.79) (0.27) 
Former USSR a -1.53 (dropped) -1.67+ (dropped) 
 (0.93)  (0.92)  
Poland a 1.40+ (dropped) 1.11 (dropped) 
 (0.84)  (0.80)  











 (0.82) (0.48) (0.80) (0.48) 
Neither Merkel nor 4.59*** 2.68*** 4.58*** 2.69*** 
Steinbrück b (0.91) (0.44) (0.91) (0.44) 
Rile self-placement -0.83* -0.78*** -0.88* -0.78*** 
 (0.35) (0.09) (0.35) (0.09) 
INTERCEPT 1.63 3.23*** 2.24 3.23*** 
 (1.76) (0.54) (1.80) (0.54) 
Case-specific determinants of Green     
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vote relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.06 
 (0.72) (0.31) (0.75) (0.31) 
System knowledge 1.38+ -0.17 1.36 -0.17 
 (0.79) (0.29) (0.83) (0.29) 
Former USSR a -1.42 (dropped) -1.49 (dropped) 
 (1.00)  (1.14)  
Poland a 0.60 (dropped) 0.78 (dropped) 
 (0.90)  (0.92)  











 (0.72) (0.42) (0.73) (0.42) 
Neither Merkel nor 2.92** 1.84*** 3.46*** 1.84*** 
Steinbrück b (0.95) (0.49) (0.93) (0.49) 
Rile self-placement -0.35+ -0.33*** -0.48* -0.33*** 
 (0.19) (0.09) (0.22) (0.09) 
INTERCEPT 0.51 1.47* 0.98 1.47* 
 (1.30) (0.60) (1.39) (0.60) 
Case-specific determinants of FDP     
vote relative to CDU/CSU vote     
Post-election survey -0.60 -0.40 -0.47 -0.40 
 (1.21) (0.35) (1.15) (0.35) 
System knowledge -0.56 -0.92** -0.57 -0.92** 
 









 (0.63)  (0.61)  
Poland a 1.42 (dropped) 1.38 (dropped) 
 (1.05)  (1.02)  











 (1.34) (0.64) (1.25) (0.64) 
Neither Merkel nor 2.48* -0.63 2.53* -0.63 
Steinbrück b (1.18) (0.93) (1.15) (0.93) 
Rile self-placement 0.30 0.08 0.29 0.08 
 (0.25) (0.10) (0.24) (0.10) 
INTERCEPT -2.15 -0.34 -2.04 -0.35 
 (1.89) (0.72) (1.82) (0.72) 
N (alternatives) 1235 10930 1235 10930 
N (cases) 247 2154 247 2154 
Bic 644.31 2503.58 636.59 2512.85 
Note: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; robust standard errors, clustered on constituencies, are 
shown in parentheses; models estimated on weighted data to compensate for an oversampling of East German 
regions and to make the data more representative of the socio-structural outlook of the German voting age 
population (weight variable in the GLES 2013 dataset: w_ipfges_2); 
a 
reference category is remaining immigrant 
groups; 
b 
reference group is Merkel 
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Appendix Table 65: Robustness alternative-specific mixed conditional logit models (random 
effects) 
 






Alternative-specific determinants of   
party vote choice:   
Candidate awareness 1.72** 0.89*** 
 (0.53) (0.15) 
Party identification 0.75*** 0.65*** 
 (0.16) (0.05) 
SMD vote 0.63+ 1.43*** 
 (0.34) (0.12) 
CIO 1.58** -0.47 
 (0.53) (0.36) 
sd(CIO) 0.00 1.32** 
 (0.00) (0.49) 
Case-specific determinants of SPD   
vote relative to CDU/CSU vote   
Post-election survey 0.18 0.12 
 (0.74) (0.26) 
System knowledge 0.39 -0.54* 
 (0.71) (0.26) 
Former USSR a -0.62 (dropped) 
 (0.92)  
Poland a 0.75 (dropped) 
 (0.85)  
First generation 0.38 (dropped) 
 (0.84)  
Steinbrück b 20.50+ 3.03*** 
 (12.29) (0.45) 
Neither Merkel nor 3.19*** 2.10*** 
Steinbrück b (0.87) (0.51) 
Rile self-placement -0.44* -0.24** 
 (0.21) (0.08) 
INTERCEPT 0.36 0.66 
 (1.45) (0.49) 
Case-specific determinants of The   
Left vote relative to CDU/CSU vote   
Post-election survey 0.38 -0.06 
 (0.87) (0.28) 
System knowledge 1.07 -0.77** 
 (0.81) (0.27) 
Former USSR a -1.60+ (dropped) 
 (0.94)  
Poland a 1.48+ (dropped) 
 (0.85)  
First generation 0.20 (dropped) 
 (0.80)  
Steinbrück b 19.50 2.76*** 
 (11.89) (0.48) 
Neither Merkel nor 4.61*** 2.70*** 
Steinbrück b (0.93) (0.45) 
Rile self-placement -0.85** -0.80*** 
 (0.33) (0.09) 
INTERCEPT 1.52 3.37*** 
 (1.77) (0.55) 
Case-specific determinants of Green   
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 (0.77) (0.32) 
System knowledge 1.29 -0.22 
 (0.80) (0.28) 
Former USSR a -1.42 (dropped) 
 (0.97)  
Poland a 0.54 (dropped) 
 (0.94)  
First generation -0.91 (dropped) 
 (0.77)  
Steinbrück b 20.28+ 2.80*** 
 (12.10) (0.43) 
Neither Merkel nor 2.91** 1.84*** 
Steinbrück b (0.96) (0.50) 
Rile self-placement -0.33+ -0.34*** 
 (0.19) (0.09) 
INTERCEPT 0.41 1.56** 
 (1.32) (0.59) 
Case-specific determinants of FDP   
vote relative to CDU/CSU vote   
Post-election survey -0.34 -0.44 
 (1.35) (0.35) 
System knowledge -1.15 -0.95** 
 





 (0.69)  
Poland a 1.76 (dropped) 
 (1.08)  
First generation -0.69 (dropped) 
 (0.89)  
Steinbrück b 20.27+ 1.72** 
 (11.84) (0.64) 
Neither Merkel nor 2.58* -0.67 
Steinbrück b (1.23) (0.94) 
Rile self-placement 0.35 0.07 
 (0.28) (0.10) 
INTERCEPT -2.79 -0.20 
 (2.05) (0.73) 
N (alternatives) 1235 10930 
N (cases) 247 2154 
Bic 628.20 2505.58 
Note: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; robust standard errors, clustered on constituencies, are 
shown in parentheses; models estimated on weighted data to compensate for an oversampling of East German 
regions and to make the data more representative of the socio-structural outlook of the German voting age 
population (weight variable in the GLES 2013 dataset: w_ipfges_2); 
a 
reference category is remaining immigrant 
groups; 
b 
reference group is Merkel 
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